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PRICE FIXING IN AGRICULTURE
— by Neil E. Harl*
For decades after the emergence of price fixing as a per seoffense under federal
antitrust law,1 the major concern about price fixing in agriculture was the scope of the
agricultural immunity2 from antitrust challenge in the face of efforts to combine to fix
the prices at which agricultural products are marketed.3  In more recent years,
however, the focus has shifted to price fixing by increasingly concentrated input
suppliers and output processors, handlers and shippers.4  The recent high profile case
involving price fixing for lysine and citric acid is an example of recent antitrust
concerns in this area and involved criminal charges.5  A deci ion handed down on
June 18, 2002, by the same court (the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals) is an
example of a recent civil action for price fixing.6
The significance of cases that certain practices are illegal pe  ses evidentiary in that
it is only necessary to prove that price fixing has occurred.  The recent case involving
high fructose corn sweetners (HFCS) provides a useful analysis of what is required to
show that price fixing has occurred for purposes of a civil case where the standard is a
preponderance of the evidence.7
The HFCS case
In the June 18, 2002, decision, In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation,8
the defendants were the principal manufacturers of high fructose corn syrup—Archer-
Daniels-Midland (ADM), A.E. Staley, Cargill, American Maize Products and CPC
International.9  CPC International had settled out of court and was no longer a party to
the action.10  The plaintiffs were a certified class consisting of direct purchasers of the
product from the defendants.11
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants secretly agreed, in 1988, to raise the
prices of HFCS with the conspiracy continuing from 1989 until mid-1995 when the
Federal Bureau of Investigation raided ADM offices in search of evidence in the
lysine/citric acid price fixing case brought by the Department of Justice.12 The distr t
court concluded that “no reasonable jury could find in [the plaintiff’s] favor on the
record presented in this case without resorting to pure speculation or conjecture” and
granted summary judgment for the defendants.13  The plaintiffs appealed the district
court decision on several grounds.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the statutory language in Section 1 of the
Sherman Act14 is broad enough to encompass a price fixing agreement that did not
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involve any actual communication among the parties to the
agreement.15  As the court noted, “if a firm raises price in the
expectation that its competitors will do likewise, and they do,
the firm’s behavior can be conceptualized as the offer of a
unilateral contract that the offerees accept by raising their
prices.”16
The court noted that, in the absence of an admission by the
defendants that they agreed to fix prices, evidence must be
presented from which the existence of such an agreement can
be inferred.17  The court explained that the evidence generally
takes the form of—(1) a showing that the structure of the
market was such as to make price fixing feasible and (2)
evidence that the market behaved in a non-competitive
manner.18  In addressing the defense argument that some of the
transactions occurred at a lower price then the level pegged by
the alleged price fixing activity, the court echoed Justice
Stone’s comments in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.19 in
stating that¾
“The reasonable price fixed today may through economic
and business changes become the unreasonable price of
tomorrow.”
The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the structure of the
market was conducive to price fixing behavior and that, during
the period of the alleged conspiracy, the defendants avoided or
at least limited price competition.20  Moreover, there was
testimony involving statements by one of the defendants’ plant
managers that, “We have an understanding within the industry
not to undercut each other’s prices.”21
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the grant of
summary judgment and sent the case back for trial to establish
whether there was a price fixing violation.
In conclusion
The June 18 decision breathes new life into price fixing
litigation.  Proving an explicit agreement to fix prices is
difficult; proving that the parties avoided or limited price
competition in a setting that is favorable for price fixing is
substantially more attainable.  This decision could have
important implications for cases arising in the future.  The
prospect of treble damages in a civil case22 provides an
economic incentive to challenge such practices.
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ADVERSE POSSESSION
FENCE . The disputed land was located between the
parties’ lands. An unknown previous owner of one of the
properties erected a barbed-wire fence between the properties
but 45 to 60 feet on the plaintiff’s side of the actual boundary.
The defendants presented no evidence of why the fence was
located there. The evidence demonstrated that the several
owners of the two properties did not discuss or object to the
fence and no one had claimed that the fence was the true
boundary. The court noted that the defendants did not provide
any evidence that the boundary was in dispute or that the
fence was erected to determine the boundary. The  evidence
showed that the defendants’ predecessors in interest made
only sporadic use of the disputed land and only as incidental
to the use of the whole property.  The court held that the
defendants did not acquire title to the disputed land by
